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Abstract
Accepting much of the internal logic of Lee’s argument, I consider the wider conditions and logics 
in play such that education as a human right can be comprehended, debated, and ultimately 
defended and supported in the 21stcentury. I suggest that despite the idealist rhetoric of UN dis-
course that operated in Lee’s conception of education as a human right, providing (Western) 
schooling to improve the lives of marginalized individuals in developing-world contexts should be 
understood as the consolation prize rather than represent an idealized/naturalized education that 
can innocently transcend the logic of underdevelopment and performativity shaping education’s 
current manifestations in developing-world contexts.
This article is a response to:
Lee, S. E. (2013). Education as a Human Right in the 21st Century. Democracy & Education, 21(1), 
Article 1. Available online at: http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol21/iss1/1
In “Education as a Human Right in the 21st Century,” Lee (2012) made a compelling and coherent argument on the justifiability and value of conceiving education as a 
human right, or high-priority claim. She accepted the necessity and 
value of a multilateral legal framework of rights but argued that, 
additionally, individuals must be able to access and use rights to 
improve their lives. Accepting much of the internal logics of her 
argument, my orientation to responding was to consider the wider 
conditions and logics in play such that education as a human right 
can be comprehended, debated, and ultimately defended and 
supported in the 21st century. From this orientation, Lee’s article 
underacknowledged the underlying conditions of economic 
inequality, the constructedness and constraining logic of under-
development, and the pressures of “performativity” (Lyotard, 1984) 
that tend to reduce the education within “education as a human 
right” to instrumental forms of Western schooling. I suggest that 
despite the idealist rhetoric of United Nations (UN) discourse that 
operated in Lee’s conception of education as a human right, 
providing (Western) schooling to improve the lives of individuals 
who are marginalized in developing-world contexts should be 
understood, and strategically supported, as the consolation prize 
over an idealized/naturalized education that can innocently 
transcend the logics of underdevelopment and performativity 
shaping education’s current manifestations in these contexts.
First I want to commend Lee on an informative and thought-
ful paper. What I draw from Lee’s text is that, indeed, education can 
and should be defended as a human right. She argued that this 
claim is both philosophically defensible and practically useful to 
building and maintaining a more just society. She drew upon a 
Rawlsian (1971, 1996, 2001) conception of justice and extended it 
with interventions from Pogge (1988, 2002), and Sen (1993, 1999, 
2003). Pogge emphasized the importance of actually existing moral 
sensibilities in relation to legal frameworks and the significance of 
interactions beyond the nation-state; Sen privileged individual 
capabilities such that the existence of legal or moral rights trans-
lates into the actual bettermentof individuals’ lives. Given the gap 
between the recognition and presence of a multilateral policy 
framework for education as a human right and the continued 
reality of millions of children still without access to primary 
schooling, Lee contended that education must be framed as a 
high-priority claim. For a child to have a fulfilling life and for 
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societies to thrive, education is a necessity. Further, it is not only 
the legal or policy architecture that is vital toward making educa-
tion available to all; such education requires cross-sector and 
multilevel mobilization.
In her article, “Education as a Human Right in the 21st 
Century,” Lee defined a right and a human right and situated the 
21st century through a focus on millennium development goals, 
modern schooling, and the millions of children in nations consid-
ered developing still without access to public schooling. Perhaps 
the underexplicated term in this paper is the unwieldy category/
phenomenon education. This underexplication seemed to allow for 
a covering up of certain tensions and conflations that from my 
perspective are in need of illumination and further discussion.
Lee’s general argument holds, and I resonate with its broad 
brushstrokes. Strategically, she offered a compelling and thorough 
account of the legitimacy of, rationale for, and usefulness of 
supporting education as a human right. Conceptually, I remain 
unsure whether the more idealist dimensions of education (read: 
child centered, autonomy) can be philosophically justified to be a 
human right given current geopolitical material realities of the 21st 
century that necessarily inflect the terms of the debate and the 
enactment of rights. Accordingly, I appreciate Lee’s use of Sen and 
Pogge, who encouraged a more materialist, grounded analysis that 
moves beyond the presence (and coherence) of a multilateral legal 
framework of rights to also consider the rights that individuals can 
actually access and use according to their own needs and wants and 
to preexisting moral imaginaries. If I have a criticism of Lee’s 
article, it is that the paper seemed to gloss a set of difficult tensions 
inherent to the conceptual-empirical terrain upon which her 
argument was built. More specifically, its ambitious mix of analytic 
reasoning, policy analysis, and interpretations of (social) context 
naturalize, at moments, social constructions like schooling. The 
purpose of my response is to illuminate such tensions toward 
gaining a better sense of what is in play and what is at stake in the 
discursive space of claiming education as a human right, of which 
Lee’s text is one good example.
The first kind of happy union that I trouble is the implied 
synergies between functionalist and idealist purposes and hopes of 
education embedded in Lee’s discussion as reflected in the UN/
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) discourses. Instrumental 
(and counting) approaches to schooling can be deeply conflicting 
with progressive conceptions. More generally, evolved neoliberal 
discourses of multilateral institutions and transnational corpora-
tions emphasizing social capital, socially responsible corporations, 
or doing good through making profits similarly blur distinctions 
between idealist and pragmatic agendas, producing outcomes that 
seem more corporate than progressive. In (post)development 
contexts, progressivism at the level of rhetoric or as externally 
imposed is likely to be interpreted more as a continuation of the 
liberally inflected colonial legacy.
Early in her introduction, Lee stated:
First, rights advocates endorse the right to education because they 
believe that if children receive basic primary education, they will likely 
be literate and numerate and will have the basic social and life skills 
necessary to secure a job, to be an active member of a peaceful 
community, and to have a fulfilling life. (Lee, p. 1)
At the beginning of the quote, I can see the emphasis on a func-
tional education, to “be literate and numerate,” to “have the basic 
social and life skills necessary to secure a job,” casting education 
largely as a tool to economic security. At the end, the more 
normative and idealist aims of being “an active member of a 
peaceful community” and of having “a fulfilling life” were included. 
These dual visions—developing the capacity to eke out a living and 
developing the child’s whole potential—were held together 
throughout the text. Lee, thus, was quite ambitious in her argu-
ment. She went beyond claiming that basic, free schooling is a 
human right in a fraught and interdependent assemblage of 
competitive modernizing states. In a sense it is the UN’s rhetoric 
that pinned Lee and education to higher goals and as beyond state 
schooling. At the same time, the UN’s idealist discourse seems 
somewhat inconsequential, not well aligned with its most famous 
Education for All movement (EFA), which effectively casts 
education as a tool for economic progress.
It’s worth highlighting the idealism found in the UN’s (and 
Lee’s) conception of education/schooling. Quoting from the 
International Covenant on Economic and Social Cultural Rights, 
Lee noted the UN’s progressive desires for education: “The States 
Parties . . . agree that education shall be directed to the full develop-
ment of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and 
shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” (p. 2). Another UN document Lee cited stipulated that 
children are “to develop their personalities, talents and abilities 
and to live a full and satisfying life within society” (p. 3). Further, 
stated Lee, children are to be provided “with a child-centered, 
child-friendly, and empowering educational environment” (p. 3). 
Nevertheless, the main policy being implemented—the MDG—is 
centered on providing basic primary schooling to all children. 
Thus, the energies and resources have been little focused on the 
ideals of progressive education and human dignity and very much 
focused on improving access to primary schooling in countries 
considered developing. I am arguing that the conditions that 
produce and demand the call for education as a human right are 
the stark global economic inequalities and the “67 million chil-
dren” (p. 1) worldwide (read: in developing countries) without 
access to schooling. Any lack of a child-friendly environment in 
schools in Western nations, for example, is unlikely on the radar. 
Further, it is a neoliberal conception of education as human capital 
development (in contrast to a child-centered education) to be 
globally competitive that has most energized governments and 
multilateral institutions to promote and fund education in contexts 
of the developing world.
I want to be clear that I personally support the higher aims of 
education, over strictly instrumental ones. And, as an educator, I 
know that there can be multiple and even conflicting agendas in 
play in practices of schooling; thus, I’m not interested in concep-
tual purity for its own sake. My concern is that education/schooling 
was being taken as too innocent a term in Lee’s paper, and the 
impetus driving funding for Education for All is founded on the 
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more instrumental goals in a context where measurable outcomes 
(like numbers of children attending primary school) are 
demanded. This is spawning the more recent calls emphasizing 
quality education in the context of increasing access to schooling in 
developing countries. In drawing on the UN educational discourse, 
Lee explicitly included statements that recognize that education is 
more than state schooling. For example, she acknowledged the role 
of parents, the wider culture, and the media. Nevertheless, for 
much of the paper, particularly in reference to the motivations for 
and outcomes of the MDG, education was conflated with Western 
schooling. By almost exclusively using the term education, as with 
the UN discourse, Lee attempted to hold together the more idealist 
purposes of education alongside the instrumental ones. 
Nevertheless, there was an unacknowledged slippage when it came 
to the actual effects of making education a high-priority claim. The 
term education was ultimately standing in for Western schooling in 
a context of underdevelopment founded on the teleology of 
Western-referenced progress.
Broadening access to free, compulsory schooling needs to be 
understood as the consolation prize in development (and First 
Nation) contexts, not naturalized as some intrinsic, ideal institu-
tion that culturally marginalized groups are to envision as a way of 
recentering their spiritual lives or of reaching their human poten-
tials. In this sense, the progressive and universalist rhetoric may do 
more to mystify what is at stake in pragmatically using schooling to 
increase children’s capacities to survive in difficult conditions, than, 
say, guide local teachers to support their students as autonomous 
citizens in the making. To further explicate, I turn back to Lee’s text 
to analyze three statements.
The naturally benevolent polarity of education (read: school-
ing) and its transformative wishes are subtly initiated early in Lee’s 
article. She wrote:
Education is an institution that typically is established through a 
collective social desire to have civil and supportive societies. And if one 
considers the social dynamic found in many countries around the 
world, there is the suggestion that usually the more education people 
have, the better off they can be [emphasis added]. (p. 2)
The first sentence definitely brought a certain innocence to 
education (here defined as an institution). It is also the case that 
mass schooling emerges under moments of economic growth and 
is oriented to shaping loyal and obedient subjects and workers with 
the appropriate skills and comportments to support economic 
productivity of the nation. The second sentence is tentatively 
constructed and likely empirically supported. The more profound 
truth, however, is the converse:that the better off people are, the 
more (and better) education they (can) have. In this sense, perhaps 
economic inequality within and between nations is the fundamen-
tal problem for which schooling as a human right represents a form 
of bandaging.
Whatever the multiple fruits of state schooling, it is also true 
that schooling becomes a target for the projection of political and 
economic problems and social anxieties. Can better or more 
schooling really create new jobs and secure more liveable wages for 
marginalized populations? Anyon (2005) lucidly critiqued such 
tenuous aims in the context of urban education. At a more (radi-
cally) philosophical level, Rancière (1991, 2004) argued that the 
dominant imaginary of schooling, including its social justice– 
oriented forms, is founded on the inherent inequality of intelli-
gence of human beings and that processes of schooling can only 
widen inequality. Rancière conceived his thesis in the context of the 
ongoing inequalities of urban schooling in the world considered 
already developed. Nevertheless, it did offer a warning that the 
promise of Western schooling in developing-world contexts, at the 
least, comes with significant vulnerabilities, such as the apparent 
inability to transcend the social stratifying effects of schooling.
A second and related assumption from Lee’s text that I trouble 
follows:
The need to elevate basic primary education to the status of a human 
right rests on the idea that we stand in a certain moral relationship to 
each other—a relation that is outside of any societal structure in which 
we may find ourselves – and that makes the claim to basic primary 
education unique and universal. (p. 4)
Here is an instance when Lee stepped too far with a universalizing 
move. I agree that we stand in a moral relationship to each other 
that transcends geopolitical boundaries and identity-forming 
institutions. But this relation cannot be outside of societal struc-
tures or institutions. Indeed, our moral relationship to each other is 
founded upon and built up in and through our social structures 
and institutions. Child-centered education as advocated within Lee’s 
argument does not stand outside of the institutions of Western 
schooling and humanist ideologies that give meaning to the term. 
We may well support a nurturing education of a child whose own 
government is not investing in public schooling and even make a 
demand on that nation-state (understanding the tendency for 
rights discourse to conceive infractions in developing countries 
through a deficit lens), but these conversations across various 
boundaries do not represent any outside of sociality. Lee’s claim to 
the universal here does not hold except perhaps in a very skeletal 
form, in the sense that the human has an innate capacity for 
learning and the child’s education or coming into the adult world 
can transcend the dictates of any particular social institution.
Ultimately the UN’s conception of a happy union between the 
educational agendas of the child’s first educators (parents and 
community) and the state is also tenuous. Indeed, the tensions 
produced from these potentially divergent agendas are a major 
pressure that complicates the idea that education can be a human 
right. Given the lack of precision in defining education and its 
internal fault lines, it is no wonder that education as a human right 
becomes mostly reduced to schooling. If this is indeed the case, we 
must be vigilant not to idealize or universalize the institution of 
schooling. The relations between education and schooling for mod-
ernization/ development represent an undertheorized dimension 
of Lee’s argument. She might have made more explicit the underly-
ing development paradigm of the multilateral institutional visions 
and goals privileging the economic and the Western trajectory of 
modernization upon which schooling is founded. To be clear, I’m 
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not advancing an anticolonial or romantic lens to criticize the uses 
of Western schooling (including child-centered pedagogy) in the 
contemporary moment. I do agree with Lee in promoting school-
ing as a human right. In particular I agree with the individual-
capabilities approach and a focus on actual effects on individuals’ 
lives that she drew from Sen’s scholarship. Nevertheless, the way 
she has pieced together her account has compelled my critical 
response.
Lee’s concluding statement is worth repeating:
It is not enough simply to defend the child’s right to access education—
one must defend the child’s right to an education, which is focused on 
the need to develop the child’s own autonomy and potential for 
independence and individual action both within the immediate 
society to which the child belongs and within the global society in 
which the child will interact. (p. 8)
She was reiterating the challenge, as she said, “to establish a new 
human rights perspective from outside of the bowels of interna-
tional law and governance” (p. 8). Again legal frameworks defend-
ing access are necessary but not sufficient. I agree wholeheartedly 
with Lee that education should develop the child’s autonomy and 
potential to act in an interdependent world. However, it seems that 
making (primary) schooling a human right in the context of 
underdevelopment and under logics of “performativity” (Lyotard, 
1984) effectively works as a very blunt intervention producing 
instrumental over progressive modes of schooling (and counting). 
And if, even still, such a blunt intervention offers some promise of 
the education for which Lee advocated in her conclusion, this 
potential promise lies not in idealizing or universalizing Western 
schooling but in a pragmatic, historically informed, and politically 
savvy operationalizing of these models with eyes wide open to the 
inherent dangers as well as to the progressive openings.
Can education “be considered a human rights issue on par 
with the right to food or the right to freedom” (Lee, p. 1), as Lee 
purported to have justified? As my response has suggested, I am 
skeptical. Enacting such a right seems to require an instrumental 
conception of education so as to produce measurable outcomes. 
Beyond the conflation of idealist and instrumental conceptions of 
schooling discussed above, there remain substantive tensions in 
need of examination where the conflicting and overlapping 
agendas of states, media, transnational actors, communities, and 
families interact in the education of children. I have argued that 
claiming education as a human right tends to dissolve to a claim for 
Western schooling in developing nations and the more idealist 
(Western) aims become empty rhetoric or become reconstituted by 
neoliberal market logics.
What is in play such that education as a human right in this 
21st century can be comprehended, debated and ultimately 
defended and supported? To conclude, I draw upon a question-
answer approach (Scott, 2005)—if Lee’s “Education as a Human 
Right in the 21st Century” represents an answer, what is the 
question? The question, I think, goes something like:
Given the existence of a liberal-inflected popular human rights 
discourse and the related weak but sometimes effective UN human 
rights legal framework and set of existing policies (as MDG) aimed at 
intervening in a globalizing world of stark, ongoing economic 
inequality and poverty, where survival of marginalized populations 
necessitates a level of access to (and participation in) Western models 
of schooling to garner some improved capacity to participate and eke 
out a living in the ecologically destructive global economy, how should 
state schooling be cast in terms of pressing states, multilaterals and 
civil societies to work with greater commitment to the well-being of 
these populations and their respective (interdependent) societies?
In coarse terms, this is the question to which Lee’s account 
represented an answer for me. My intervention has attempted to 
temper and qualify certain conflations and essentialist/innocent 
inflections of education or human rights surfacing in the argu-
ment, lest they become absorbed into the dominant arcs of 
neoliberal or Eurocentric mentalities and thereby risk circumvent-
ing the normative motivations and commitments underlying the 
mobilization of education as a human right in the 21st century.
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